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WHY A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO A QUALITY EDUCATION IS NOT ENOUGH 
 
by 
 
James Wilson* 
 
No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention above all to the 
education of youth; for the neglect of education does harm to the constitution.  
The citizen should be molded to suit the form of government under which he 
lives.1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This article relies upon the political and economic analysis of such great thinkers 
as Aristotle and Rousseau to understand and normatively evaluate constitutional caselaw 
in general and education cases in particular.  The article’s title contains its conclusion: a 
judicially created right to a quality education is a laudable, but possibly 
counterproductive and definitely insufficient condition, for creating a humane 
constitutional system.  The rest of society needs to do far more to protect the average 
citizen and worker from the ever-ravenous ruling class.  All the edification in the world 
will not mean much if there are only a few decent jobs available, jobs that promote 
human dignity, a decent family life, a satisfactory income, and a sustainable economy 
that does not wreck our biosphere. 
 Some progressives may initially bristle at the notion of applying economics to the 
Constitution and to constitutional law.  After all, the emergence of the “law and 
economics” movement in the 1970s was symptomatic of the increasing ascendancy of the 
“rule of capital” over the “rule of law.”   Starting from Aristotle’s common-sense 
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assumption that “The usefulness . . . depends upon its quantity even where there is no 
difference in quality . . . just as a greater weight depresses the scale more,”2 these lawyers 
claimed that their techniques improved foresight, thereby increasing the likelihood of a 
society’s obtaining “a greater weight” of whatever preference it wanted.  By merging the 
self-evident goal of maximizing the overall benefits compared to costs with the technique 
of reducing all questions to the common denominator of money, they elevated utility 
above justice, pleasure and wealth above duty and happiness.  They applied a variety of 
formulas, ranging from the illuminating supply-demand curve to elaborate mathematical 
models, thereby creating the impression (at least to themselves) that they were engaging 
in a science instead of an art.  But it was a “science” with a partisan political agenda.  
Where Aristotle sought the best mixture of the “good and useful,”3 they wanted to 
maximize “efficiency.”   By making wealth accumulation the primary norm, they 
accelerated the inherent tendency of capital to accumulate in relatively fewer hands.   
Empowering capital by deregulation and increased mobility invariably comes at the cost 
of labor, small business, stable communities, and the environment.4 
 While these skillful analysts often revealed consequences that many had not seen 
before, they usually ignored reasons for existing practices that did not satisfy the 
preferences already imbedded in their economic imagery.  For example, they used Judge 
Learned Hand’s famous formula in tort law5 to limit liability to those situations in which 
the defendant’s economic costs to prevent the accident were less than the total amount of 
                                                                                                                                                 
1  ARISTOTLE, Politics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 2121 (J. Barnes ed. 1991). 
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the costs of the injuries caused by the defendant’s existing actions or inactions.  This 
formulation eliminates one major reason why so many Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
wanted to amend the proposed Constitution to protect their constitutional right to civil 
jury trials.  One of the functions of a jury in a republican government is to constrain the 
rich and powerful by redistributing wealth to the weaker members of society.  The 
Framers understood that the wealthy tend to exploit their fellow citizens.  Whenever this 
exploitation becomes too brutal, juries could -- and would -- strike back.  Anti-trust law 
was an even more important target.  Relying on abstract myths about market conditions 
and functions, future judges such as Richard Posner and Robert Bork argued that market 
size and domination should never be considered illegally “unreasonable” under the 
Sherman Antitrust Act6  because some other competitor could always enter the market.  
Thus, there were no legal limits to capital’s inherent tendency to consolidate and to 
dominate governments, labor, the environment, and markets.   The Anti- trust Act’s 
original concerns about corporate abuses and private tyranny were dismissed as 
misguided relics of an earlier era.     
 The maximization methodology can be extended to virtually every human 
decision because “time is money” and people must “choose” between different mixtures 
of “costs” and “benefits” to “maximize” their “preferences.”  Although Posner went 
through a stage when he apparently sought to reduce every normative issue to economic 
analysis,7 he eventually concluded that law and economics is best limited to the common 
law areas (and Anti- trust), not traditional constitutional issues.  Thus, at the very moment 
when some combination of Madisonian Marxism and clever microeconomic theorizing 
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would have revealed many insights into the predictable effects of various constitutional 
doctrines on the distribution of wealth and power within the United States’ political 
economy, Judge Posner adopted the far more amorphous concept of “pragmatism.”  More 
conservative counterparts, such as Justices Scalia and Thomas, publicly rely on such 
abstractions as “text,” “history,” “tradition,” and “structure” to justify their constitutional 
choices.  They bizarrely claim they can better help run American society by not 
considering the morality or the consequences of what they are doing.  Admittedly, some 
law and economics professors applied their microeconomic jargon to constitutional cases, 
forcing the rest of us to try to remember the difference between “ex ante” and “ex post.”  
However, such microeconomic analysis begged the most important constitutional 
descriptive and normative question predating Aristotle: how are wealth and power 
actually distributed in a particular society?  
 An economic approach combining the insight-generating tools of microeconomics 
with the profoundly illuminating perceptions of Aristotelian-Marxist distributive 
macroeconomics undermines the hoary belief that judges do not make “policy” based 
upon foreseeable consequences but instead rely on “principles” plucked from text and 
history.  It reveals how frequently and profoundly the Constitution itself and the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of that document influence the perpetual struggle between the few 
and the many.  Macroeconomic analysis of constitutional law raises questions of 
distributive justice, concerns that call into question the foreseeable effects of the 
relentless use of microeconomics in private law and the expressed indifference to 
economic consequences in constitutional law—the concentration of wealth and power in 
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fewer hands at the expense of the middle class, the working poor, and the desperately 
poor at home and abroad.  Economic considerations drag the legal system into the dirty 
worlds of money and politics, reducing any judicial claims to neutrality and autonomy.  
For example, the 1974 Supreme Court’s creation in Buckley v. Valeo8 of free speech 
rights facially favoring the wealthy by permitting them to spend as much money as they 
wanted on themselves remains the most flagrant example of doctrinal class warfare.  It is 
not coincidental that soon after Buckley, both political parties quickly moved to the right 
to raise more campaign money.  Money has many attributes, but neutrality is not one of 
them.   History, Aristotelian theory, and modern economics all teach us that the rich will 
collectively spend a large part of their discretionary wealth to make themselves richer. 
The crude reductionism of the law and economics movement should not prevent us from 
learning and applying some of the classical theories about political economy. 
 Focusing on the relationship of the written Constitution to the United States’ 
overall political economy also reveals some of the dangers in basing one’s system on the 
assumption that improving individuals’ faculties through the maximization of wealth is 
the ultimate end and everything else is a means to that end.  Rather, our society should 
perceive individual and human self-satisfaction -- ends that require a certain degree of 
wealth to be realized -- as legitimate Kantian ends that must compete against other 
compelling interests.  The economist Herman Daly and the theologian John Cobb 
described some of the grave distortions caused by the economic theory imbedded in our 
civilization, Constitution, and constitutional doctrine:  
Just as the absence of acknowledgment of community in economic theory 
has led to the destruction of human community in economic practice, so 
also the neglect of the physical world in economic theory has led to its 
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degradation in economic practice.  We do not believe the reduction of 
nature to matter as formless passivity or to a construct of the human mind 
can be justified, and we doubt that anyone can live and think consistently 
in those terms.9  
 
 
Quite simply, the interrelated threats of violent class war and environmental catastrophe 
(not to mention the basic indecency of such practices) require that we redefine our 
notions of constitutionalism to start dealing with these problems.   We cannot wait for the 
Constitution’s text to change, nor can we expect or even wish for the judiciary to be 
primarily responsible for solving these difficult and enduring problems.  Constitutional 
lawyers need to take their useful techniques and powerful norms outside the courtroom. 
  
II.  EDUCATION, “FORMAL EQUALITY,” AND “EQUAL OPPORTUNITY” 
 
 Both Aristotle and Rousseau shed important light on the two underlying 
conceptions of equality that have animated the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence in education cases: “formal equality” and “equal opportunity.”  Because 
such abstract analysis quickly becomes tedious when unsupported by specific examples, 
this article shall first briefly review the Supreme Court’s fluctuations between these two 
approaches.      
 The text of the United States Constitution does not contain the word “education.” 
Consequently, humanitarian judicial activists needed to rely upon the Constitution’s more 
abstract passages.  To strike down racist school systems in the states and in the District of 
Columbia, the liberal justices of the Warren Court turned to the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and a creatively implied counterpart, the “equal protection 
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component” of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.   While Brown v. Board of 
Education10 was such an important victory that it legitimated judicial review for the 
entire twentieth century, it had an important omission.  Chief Justice Warren could not 
convince his colleagues that all children had a “fundamental right” to an education under 
an “equal opportunity” interpretation of the equal protection mandates.   Brown spoke 
ambiguously, making education the focal point of subsequent judicial efforts to improve 
society.  However, the decision doctrinally limited its focus primarily to racial (and later 
gender) issues, an emphasis that tended to elevate a conception of “formal equality” 
hostile to racial and sexual categories above a notion of “equal opportunity” that would 
provide a quality education for all.    
 The concept of  “formal equality” seeks fairness by preventing governments from 
using certain traits, notably race and gender, to disable individuals.  Violations are fairly 
easy to diagnose and remedy because the Court can delete virtually all statutory 
references to any “suspect classifications.”  The doctrine is also relatively inexpensive 
because the Court does not require the state to provide any services; it merely prevents 
the states from invidiously offering their pre-existing services.  Thus the state can either 
raise its services equally for all or reduce them equally for all.  The equal opportunity 
vision is more substantive.  Its assumption that adequate education can solve our most 
pressing social and political problems requires governments to spend a large amount of 
money to educate every child living in America.  But equal opportunity resembles formal 
equality in its aversion to substantive outcomes.  Both the Court’s and society’s 
obligations to people radically diminish after they graduate from school and enter an 
economic system dominated by private power and regulated at a constitutional level by a 
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far less compassionate conception of formal equality.  Under both approaches, the 
judicial goal is to create a “level playing field” for subsequent class and individual 
competition. 
 The two norms of racial and educational equality initially appeared to be 
compatible, but soon came into conflict.  Eliminating Southern apartheid and combating 
more insidious forms of Northern school segregation immediately improved the quality 
of education for many black and white children.  The black children received more 
resources under a far less stigmatic system, and some fortunate white children now were 
educated with their fellow African-American citizens.  One of the most important 
educational molds for all Americans is learning the importance of overcoming with 
tolerance and affection their grisly history of racial injustice and hostility.  During this 
optimistic period, it seemed as if the federal judiciary, often supported by the other two 
branches, could create a meaningful right to “equal opportunity” through equal education 
of the races.  Everyone knew that improving the conditions of blacks would improve life 
for many poor people because so many of the impoverished were African-American. 
 Tragically, the federal judiciary’s focus on race frequently came at the expense of 
class-based concerns. Instead of requiring a high-quality education for everyone—
something that could be partially measured through such basic techniques as class size, 
teacher payrolls, types of classes, and classroom support—the Court made desegregation 
its immediate goal and school busing its primary remedy. 11  The consequences were easy 
to foresee, whether one uses economic tools or not—the burden of curing urban school 
segregation fell upon both the black and white working classes who inhabited the inner 
cities, which had a long history of racism since they were the places where the races 
commingled.  Neighborhood schools disappeared, isolating black and white parents from 
the one public institution that helped their families the most.  Many whites and middle-
class blacks fled the steadily declining public school systems by sending their children to 
parochial schools or by moving to nearby suburbs.  The racially focused remedies 
reinforced the blacks’ understandable sense of racial injustice, exacerbating the 
destructive conclusion of many that they should not actively participate in the educational 
system for fear of becoming an “Uncle Tom.”  The white working class reacted with 
rage; a rage admittedly influenced by racism, but also by a correct foreboding that 
liberals and conservatives alike would consistently downplay their interests in the future.  
For many millions, judicial conceptions of  “formal equality” and “equal educational 
opportunity for all” meant increased racial polarization and political disempowerment 
over their children’s education. 
 The liberal justices should not be blamed for all the subsequent disasters that have 
left many inner city public schools in a state of chaos.  In part, because the liberal Justices 
angered so many white working class voters who had previously voted for the 
Democratic Party, the liberals soon were outnumbered by far more conservative 
colleagues who were uninterested in either racial or economic justice.  In Milliken v. 
Bradley, the conservatives limited the divisive, counterproductive remedy of busing to 
the inner cities that initially faced racial problems, leaving the allegedly innocent suburbs 
free from any constitutional obligations.12  Although many progressives have attacked 
this opinion, it may have been the best result for the more humane wing of the 
Democratic Party.  Imagine the political backlash if inner-city students had been bussed 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968). 
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throughout the suburbs.  It is very likely that many inner ring suburbs would have quickly 
let their school systems deteriorate through yet another wave of privatization and class 
flight.   
 As part of their agenda to stop the liberals from interpreting the Constitution to 
protect the poor, the conservatives decided, in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
that the states could continue to have school districts that spent significantly different 
amounts depending upon their tax base.13  Just as the Plessy Court had put on blinders to 
deny the racial impact of segregated trains,14 the Rodriguez Court claimed that the poor 
and working class were not being discriminated against because not every member of an 
impoverished school district would be poor.15  Under this conception of “formal 
equality,” the Constitution’s concerns about education diminished once state officials 
stopped using race as a factor.   
 In Plyler v. Doe, Justice Powell, who had cast the swing vote in Rodriguez, 
created a limited judicial conception of “equal opportunity.”16   States could not 
“absolutely deny” a child an education, even though they could continue to provide lousy 
learning experiences.  Thus, something like Warren’s equal opportunity “fundamental 
right to an education” became part of the doctrine.  This test was judicially manageable 
because it would be easy for plaintiffs to prove “complete deprivation.”  It kept the Court 
from determining the proper way to run and finance schools.  But even this grudging, 
limited right has been undermined; in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, the Supreme 
Court held that a State could, in effect, “completely deprive” a poor child of a public 
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education by charging that child’s parents with busing fees.17  Apparently there is nothing 
in the Constitution to prevent the states from precluding the poor by transferring massive 
costs to them.   In a few states -- including Ohio -- state courts have attempted, with 
varying degrees of success, to impose more egalitarian educational systems through their 
interpretation of state constitutions.  Subsequent popular outrage and political resistance 
indicate that courts will rarely have the authority or capacity to adequately correct this 
continuing constitutional outrage. Nor did Congress ever seriously intervene to provide 
funds to equalize educational opportunities.   American justices and politicians talk of 
“the land of opportunity,” but they implement an educational system that exacerbates the 
different levels of opportunity actually available for the different classes. 
 What is to be learned by this agonizing tale, a mixture of dazzling judicial 
triumphs, most notably the desegregation of Southern public schools, judicial 
overreaching through the remedy of busing, and judicial and legislative callousness 
toward the continuing plight of minority, poor, and working-class families?  The most 
obvious solution for ambitious constitutional lawyers is to propose a judicially created 
“equal right to a quality education for all” that is indifferent to modes of taxation and 
funding.  Such a right would diminish the importance of race and regain the allegiance of 
many white and black voters who want more control over local schools.  But there are 
serious problems with such a doctrine.  Under our representative system of government, 
the legislative branch is primarily responsible for raising the taxes to provide 
governmental services.  Courts are ill- fitted to run educational institutions.  How can a 
judge determine, as a matter of constitutional law, what is the right mixture of 
administrators and teachers, construction projects and special education classes?  A 
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judicially mandated quality education would raise taxes while threatening the suburban 
status quo by requiring the wealthy suburbanites to pay more for less.  The backlash 
could strengthen political conservatism for decades. Most importantly, there is little 
reason to believe that such a right, whether enforced by the federal courts or subsidized 
by Congress, will be sufficient to create a stable, humane society because both “formal 
equality” and “equal opportunity” fail to address basic constitutional problems. 
 
III.  ARISTOTLE, AGRARIAN LAWS, AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
 The flaw with the above story, like most other constitutional law textbooks and 
articles, is that it is excessively court- focused.18  When most American lawyers and 
citizens think of the word “Constitution,” they immediately envision an ancient, unique 
document supported by volumes of legal decisions and interpretations.  Aristotle provides 
us with several different conceptions of constitutionality that permit us to escape this 
murky, unsatisfying story. The most important has already been discussed: a country’s 
“constitution” consists of its distribution of wealth and power between the many, the few, 
and the one (if there is a monarchy or tyranny).19   Aristotle thus anticipated Madison’s 
concerns about civil conflicts over the distribution of property and Marx’s anger at the 
capitalists’ systemic exploitation of labor.  Under Aristotle’s definition, constitutional 
lawyers and analysts need to look far beyond the Court and its opinions both to 
understand their particular system and to solve its problems.  The legislative branches of 
Congress and the Presidency become crucial parts of any worthwhile, viable 
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Possible?, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP . J. 1-18 (1999). 
19 ARISTOTLE, supra  note 1, at 2030-31. 
constitutional vision.  Lawyers need to take their social engineering skills, their capacity 
to design constitutional doctrine to solve basic social problems, and apply them to issues 
that will be primarily resolved by Congress and the President.   For instance, it is hard to 
imagine that the Courts could ever single-handedly create and enforce a “right to a 
quality education.”  Looking beyond judicial doctrine also enables us to make 
constitutional arguments to institutions like Congress that have rarely been seen as the 
repository of important Constitutional rights.  These more overtly political arguments 
reveal additional reasons for a quality education; reasons that might persuade a more 
humane Court to act at the margins. 
 The big difference between Aristotle and most contemporary constitutional legal 
theorists is that Aristotle feared both the rich and the poor.  As a group, the rich grow up 
pampered, unsympathetic to democratic norms.  They sense, quite rightly, that internal 
democracy is the greatest threat to their wealth.  Their greed knows no limits; they are 
willing to drive the masses into poverty to gain additional wealth.  Aside from massive 
poverty’s inherent immorality caused by the widespread destruction of individual 
happiness, severe wealth disparity increases the risk of revolution.  The people will either 
try to overthrow the powerful or they will turn to a demagogue purporting to represent 
them against their rapacious superiors.  In America, public power is always questioned, 
but the legitimacy of private power is rarely considered a constitutional issue.  The 
American Constitution aggravates this problem by explicitly limiting private power only 
once, outlawing slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment.  Thus, traditional 
constitutional analysis continually questions the “legitimacy” of judicial review and the 
threat of “majoritarian tyranny,” but rarely worries about the “legitimacy” of the rich and 
the dangers of “private tyranny.” 
 Aristotle harshly proposed that constitutional democracies exile20 the excessively 
rich to guarantee the triumph of the relatively stable middle class over the rich and poor: 
“[W]here the middle class is large, there are least likely to be factions and dissensions.”21   
Aristotle also sought to provide public assistance to those less fortunate citizens so they 
would not plunge into alienating poverty.  For example, the city could pay them to be 
jurors.  Overall, Aristotle proposed a political economy shaped like a trapezoid: the state 
would eliminate the wealthiest members, while raising the poorest section to a tolerable 
level.  Toward the end of the Roman Republic, the Gracchi brothers implemented an 
alternative means to reaching a trapezoidal system that does not turn the rich into a 
coalition of dangerous martyrs living at home and exiled abroad, eager to use their wealth 
to strike back at the system that threatens them.  Under the “agrarian laws,” the state took 
the extensive lands of the wealthy and distributed them to the poor so they could make a 
living.   A similar system could be created in the United States by reestablishing high 
marginal income tax rates on the wealthy, eliminating most tax exemptions for the 
wealthy, and increasing taxes on their personal and intangible property.  Most 
importantly, the system should severely tax intergenerational wealth transfers to prevent 
the rise of a hereditary aristocracy. 
 But what support can be given the poor that would be the equivalent of excessive 
lands redistributed to Roman citizens?   Two of the major purposes of the agrarian laws 
were to make the poor economically self-sufficient and politically committed to their 
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society.  Thus, any modern alternative should seek the same goals.  At the least, every 
American child ought to have a constitutional right to enough basic resources (such as 
food, clothing, housing, and health care) and a quality education so that he or she can 
make a good living in this primarily nonagrarian society.  However, agrarian laws take us 
far beyond “equal opportunity.”  So long as people are willing and able to work (which 
includes the raising of children), the government should provide them with decent jobs.   
No matter what happens to particular individuals, we should not let the poor live in 
hopeless squalor.    The agrarian analogy can be more specific.  Assuming that Herman 
Daly and John Cobb are correct in arguing that family farms have more long-run viability 
than federally supported corporate farming, our government should limit farms to a 
certain size and to individual families, creating numerous new opportunities for hard-
working families.   
 
IV.  ROUSSEAU AND FORMAL EQUALITY 
 The more conservative members of the current Supreme Court generally rely on 
“formal equality” to resolve most “equal protection” issues, including those surrounding 
education.  The most pressing and immediate example is the affirmative action 
controversy, which pits the conservatives’ hatred of racial categories against the more 
moderate members’ acknowledgment of the continuing, tragic need to use race as a 
benign factor.  Historically, the Lochner era represented the high-water mark of formal 
equality by attempting to constitutionalize the formal equality permeating the common 
law.22  Under that theory, redistributive purposes (at least to benefit labor) could never 
be part of a government’s agenda.  
 Because of formal equality’s champions and its claimed indifference to 
substantive outcomes, some leftists will be tempted to jettison the doctrine completely as 
yet another example of legalistic obfuscation and oppression.  But as is usually the case, 
such global dismissals of modes of legal reasoning throw out much of value.  The formal 
egalitarians are following Chief Justice Marshall’s approach in McCulloch v. Maryland23 
of preventing injustice by insuring that the burdens or benefits of a law fall equally on all 
those affected.  Marshall held that the states could not tax federal bank “operations,” but 
could tax federal real property because the states would have an incentive to overtax the 
federal banks’ operations to make a profit and destroy a rival, 24 but they would not want 
to raise general property taxes to a high level since that would hurt their own citizenry 
far more than the bank.  In other words, a proper definition of “formal equality” limits a 
majority’s capacity to oppress a minority because it cannot single out that minority.  Any 
legal disabilities must be distributed equally.  Thus, Brown was correctly decided under a 
humanitarian conception of formal equality in that it held that states could not segregate 
black and white students.  The use of race for malicious reasons, like the special tax on 
the federal bank, was dangerously and temptingly specific.  Although formal equality 
cannot solve many constitutional problems, it winnows out many oppressive forms of 
governmental action.  For another example, the First Amendment doctrine of “viewpoint 
neutrality” precludes governments from “suppressing” a particular political viewpoint.  
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of formal equality in the common law applied to Lochner). 
23 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
Although the application of that doctrine will remain controversial in the details, it is a 
good thing that governments cannot totally prevent American citizens from fully 
expressing their political beliefs. 
 This endorsement of formal equality remains half-hearted because Rousseau has 
explained how formal equality contains its own political economy, one that 
conservatives find inherently congenial.  Like Aristotle, Rousseau feared the “tyranny of 
the rich.”25  Rousseau wanted the state to deprive individuals of the opportunity of 
becoming rich instead of stripping them of their preexisting wealth.  Rousseau’s “equal 
opportunity” did not include the possibility of great wealth.   In his Second Discourse, 
Rousseau describes the formation of a social contract in terms far different and far more 
illuminating than Locke’s generally reasonable men and Hobbe’s frightened, violent 
masses.26   
 Although Rousseau never used the term “noble savage,” the phrase captures his 
romantic beliefs about unspoiled, uncivilized human nature.   Fortunately, one does not 
have to either accept or deny this idealized state to appreciate the power and relevance of 
his subsequent anthropological description of the changes in social relationships.  At 
first, ignorant humans crowded together in tribes like monkeys and crows.27  But their 
powerful minds slowly created language, which enabled them to foresee events more 
clearly.  With increased foresight, they could deve lop industry, leading to crude 
conceptions of property regulated by force.  The human heart became more generous 
                                                                                                                                                 
24 Id. at 436. 
25 Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER 
POLITICAL WRITINGS 19 (V. Gourevtich ed. and trans., 1997). 
26 JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON POLITICAL ECONOMY, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER 
LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS 19 (V. Gourevtich ed. and trans., 1997). 
27 Id. at 163. 
once it formed into social units called families.  But such progress exacted its costs; 
humans invented new things which quickly “degenerated into true needs.”28   Slowly, 
these families formed tribes and nations.  Although each person had the power to 
determine his or her rights, the social order was the “best for man” because it was neither 
so primitive nor so brutally sophisticated.   Tragically, cooperation led to tyranny: 
 
[B]ut the moment one man needed the help of another; as soon as it was 
found to be useful for one to have provisions for two, equality 
disappeared, property disappeared, work became necessary, and the vast 
forests changed into smiling fields that had to be watered with the sweat of 
men, and where slavery and misery were soon seen to sprout and grow 
together with the harvests.29 
 
Inevitably, those who were more ingenious, harder working, more skillful, or more 
fortunate would prevail over their fellow citizens.   Soon, a new class of men emerged 
from this process: “[t]he rich, for their part, had scarcely become acquainted with the 
pleasure of dominating than they disdained all other pleasures, and using their old Slaves 
to subject new ones.”30   But the poor fought back: “[t]he breakdown of equality was 
followed by the most frightful disorder: thus the usurpations of the rich, and the Banditry 
of the Poor, and the unbridled passions of all, stifling natural pity and the still weak 
voice of justice, made men greedy, ambitious, and wicked.”31   The rich quickly 
recognized that they had more to lose through such a violent version of class war.  By 
emphasizing existing excesses, the rich brilliantly persuaded the majority to adopt a 
system of formal equality: 
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Let us united to protect the weak from oppression, restrain the ambitious, 
and secure for everyone the possession of what belongs to him: Let us 
institute rules of Justice and peace to which all are obliged to conform, 
which favor no one, and which in a way make up for the vagaries of 
fortune by subjecting the powerful and weak alike to mutual duties.  In a 
word, instead of turning our forces against one another, let us gather them 
into a supreme power that might govern us according to wise Laws . . . .32 
 
Rousseau believed this argument was “specious” because it entrenched the power 
of the already powerful and guaranteed the triumph of future elites.  Nevertheless, the 
poor accepted the contract because they sensed that this was the best deal they could get.  
When a person or a group has unequal bargaining power, formal equality is a huge step 
forward from oppression. Admittedly, the powerful had to give up some rights, but they 
now had the formal rule of law to protect them as they continued their plundering ways:  
Such was, or must have been, the origin of Society and of Laws, which 
gave the weak new fetters, and the rich new forces, irreversibly destroyed 
natural freedom, forever fixed the Law of property and inequality, 
transformed a skillful usurpation into an irrevocable right, and for the 
profit of a few ambitious men henceforth subjugated the whole of 
Mankind to labor, servitude and misery. 33 
 
This chilling anthropology is worth reviewing because it seems more accurate 
than the story of a group of equals making social contracts through majoritarian 
procedures.  But even if fails to accurately describe mankind’s original transition into 
lawful tyranny, it predicts, to a remarkable degree, the formation of the United States 
Constitution.  One of the Framers’ major concerns at the Constitutional Convention was 
to provide as little democracy as possible to the people, although they knew that they 
needed the people’s support to implement their program.  For instance, the delegates 
reluctantly conceded that there should not be any property qualifications for 
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Congressional members.  To persuade reluctant Americans to adopt the new 
Constitution, these men pointed to threats from both ends of the spectrum.  The Shays 
Revolution and Rhode Island pro-debtor legislation demonstrated the problems with too 
much democracy.  But the seditious rumblings within the Society of Cinncinatius were 
equally grim reminders of how the wealthy might respond if their needs were not met.  
To a large degree, the Constitution represented a deal between the few and the many.  
The “many” would be allowed to elect directly one-sixth of the government, the House 
of Representatives.  An agrarian precapitalist, Madison also hoped that the rich would 
never become so rich that they would destroy the necessary virtue of the Aristotlean 
yeoman farmer.  Influenced by Malthus, Madison feared that one day the rich would 
dominate the republic through clever manipulation of the poor.  Historical experience 
has partially validated Rousseau’s and Madison’s dire predictions.  Formal equality 
simultaneously protects every productive person while allowing the rich to manipulate 
the legal system to increase their power over the citizenry.  While various conceptions of 
“merit” may define aristocracies for some time, Rousseau explained how wealth 
becomes the predominate factor: “[B]eing the most immediately useful to well-being and 
the easiest to transmit, it can readily be used to buy all the rest.”34 
 More enlightened thinkers like Jefferson and Madison were not completely 
committed to formal equality and the eventual triumph of the wealthy.  Education would 
be available to all regardless of income so that everyone could have the opportunity to 
compete.  Eliminating the doctrine of primogeniture would prevent wealth from 
accumulating in too few hereditary hands.   State laws, enforced by juries, were the parts 
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of the constitutional system that would redistribute the wealth to maintain basic 
economic equality so necessary for a republic’s moral health and stability.  This analysis 
demonstrates why some part of our constitutional system must proceed beyond formal 
equality to prevent a class subordination that Rousseau believes will eventually lead to 
slavery.  It also shows why we can only expect so much from the judiciary.  The issue is 
too vast and important to be left to the vagaries of constitutional lawyering through the 
awkward tool of judicial review.   Because the judiciary cannot effectively solve most of 
our most pressing constitutional questions, we need to separate many of the judiciary’s 
findings of constitutionality – conclusions that are often based upon reasonable beliefs 
about judicial competence and judicial role – from the understandable impression that 
those issues have thus become immune from further constitutional inquiry.  Although 
many American lawyers may not like it, we need to utilize frequently the English 
argument that many governmental actions can be “unconstitutional” without necessarily 
being illegal.35   
 
V.  SCHOOL VOUCHERS: A CASE STUDY IN PRIVATE POWER, EDUCATION, AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW  
 
 If one believes that private power, manifested through concentrated individual 
wealth and corporate institutions, is a great threat to our constitutional republic, how 
much should and could that belief affect constitutional law concerning education?  I shall 
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explore that question by applying it to the issue of publicly financed vouchers for 
nonpublic education.  One answer is that the proposition is judicially irrelevant; Supreme 
Court justices should keep their economic preferences out of constitutional doctrine.  But 
that default rule has at least two costs.  It tends to drive the Court toward formal equality, 
which has its own set of economic biases, and it leaves more humanitarian justices unable 
to counterattack against the current conservative justices’ eagerness to constitutionalize 
their economic vision through such areas as federalism and the First Amendment.  The 
Court should create doctrine that protects public education from private power in much 
the same way that it presently separates church and state. 
 Advocates of judicial restraint would reply that it is much better to make such 
constitutional arguments to the legislative branches.  Courts cannot build a coherent 
“wall” separating public and private power.  It surely must be permissible for schools to 
hire private contractors and private sellers of textbooks.  Must federal courts ban Coca-
Cola machines in the same way they preclude the posting of the Ten Commandments?  
Given the existing doctrinal chaos surrounding church and state issues in terms of 
supporting parochial schools, it is easy to foresee even more arbitrary outcomes if some 
members of the Court aggressively implemented this new agenda (even if they kept their 
motives sub rosa by following their conservative colleagues’ example of dressing up 
their economic beliefs as First Amendment, separation-of-church-and-state issues). 
 The crucial constitutional issue of how to mold our children through education to 
create a better society needs to be fought primarily in the political arena.  The legal 
doctrine concerning church and state can provide some guidance to subsequent political 
debate.  There should be no advertisements in school, just as there are no crucifixes.  The 
students’ textbooks should not contain math questions such as the following: “Joey wants 
to buy two pairs of Nike shoes.  Each pair costs $138.  The onerous state tax is seven per 
cent.  How much must he pay?”   On the other hand, the following question would be 
acceptable in a social studies book: “Each pair of Nike shoes costs $138.  Nike paid each 
Indonesian fifty cents for making a pair of those shoes.  What percentage of the 
consumer’s cost goes to the actual producer?”  After all, that question explores the role of 
corporate capitalism in our society, just as public schools can and should teach about the 
influence of religions on society.  Any use of modern media should not contain 
advertising.  Perhaps public schools could build their own websites and basic search 
machines so that students do not have to be pummeled with advertising while they learn 
how to use the Internet. 
 But judicial restraint does not necessarily mean complete judicial withdrawal.  
Whatever one thinks about school vouchers, the fact that they will potentially increase 
private power’s direct influence over the education of millions of students provides 
another good reason to oppose them.  We can be sure that the enlightened educational 
corporations  will be championing the virtues of unlimited profit through the 
manipulation of state power and revenues.  But there are also good political and 
economic arguments in favor of vouchers.  Some will argue that public schools have 
already improperly indoctrinated their students into passivity, blind consumerism, and 
conformity.  Progressive private schools might better “mold” citizens than the current 
system.  Those who seek diversity will assert that a wide range of private schools will 
allow parents and communities to create a wide range of alternatives reflecting their own 
cultures.  One of the best ways to give poor children a good education may be to make 
them economically valuable through the voucher system.  One of the arguments against 
the status quo, particularly in urban schools, is that they are not doing a good job.  Then 
there is the problem of judicial competence and judicial role: rigid constitutional doctrine 
should not be used to prevent a potentially valuable experiment in educational reform. 
 Law review articles conventionally end with a confident conclusion.  But this 
article prefers to conclude with a whiff of uncertainty, if only to demonstrate how general 
propositions and multiple arguments cannot resolve particular issues.  I really do not 
know how I would decide the school voucher cases if I sat on the bench.  But I guarantee 
that the above economic considerations would reinforce my wavering inclination to find 
vouchers to be an unconstitutional violation of the doctrine of separation of church and 
state. 
 
 
